

Recent Polish Historiography on Polish-Ukrainian Relations during World War II and its Aftermath

Rafal Wnuk

Institute for National Remembrance, Lublin

Polish-Ukrainian relations belong to the most controversial and mythologized topics of Polish post-war history. During the communist regime (1944-1989) Polish popular knowledge was shaped by books by Jan Gerhard, Edward Prus or Ewa and Czesław Petelski. In these books "bandits of OUN-UPA" (*Organizacja Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów*, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, *Ukraińska Povstantscha Armia*, Ukrainian Insurgent Army) kill innocent Poles. Ukrainians are always depicted as treacherous and extremely cruel. What is important here is that the events described in these books took place in the territory of post-war Poland, but never in Volynia or Eastern Galicia regions, which were part of Soviet Ukraine. At this time, topics dealing with the "anti-Polish action of the UPA" in Volynia and Eastern Galicia were prohibited by censorship. As a result, in the Polish popular remembrance of the UPA, the site of the mass murders was transferred from Volynia and Eastern Galicia to Bieszczady and Eastern Lubelszczyzna. Consequently, Polish communists were able to portray the "Vistula" action as the only effective way of liquidating the UPA network. Only after 1989 has it been possible to study Polish-Ukrainian relations without the interference of censorship.

Immediately after 1989 many books on Polish-Ukrainian relations appeared on the market. There were also some conferences held, materials of which were afterwards published.¹ Polish historiography after 1989 was largely shaped by the influence of earlier literature. At the same time, there were some works published that showed a different approach.

There are already several articles on the historiography of Polish-Ukrainian relations in the years of 1939-1948, the most valuable of which I find to be those by Grzegorz Motyka² and Andrzej L. Sowa.³ By Polish historiography I mean all works that were originally published in

¹ Za najwartościowsze należy uznać: materiały będące efektem sesji naukowej zorganizowanej przez Towarzystwo Polsko-Ukraińskie w Gdańsku, Koło Naukowe Historyków Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego i Związek Ukraińców w Polsce pt. *Polacy o Ukraińcach, Ukraińcy o Polakach*. ed. Adeusz Stagner, Gdańsk 1993; serię wydawnictw międzynarodowych seminariów historycznych zorganizowanych przez Światowy Związek Żołnierzy Armii Krajowej i Związek Ukraińców w Polsce *Polska – Ukraina: trudne pytania*, vol. 1-9, Warszawa 1998-2002., oraz materiały posesyjne wydane przez Instytut Pamięci Narodowej *Antypolska Akcja OUN-UPA 1943-1944. Fakty i interpretacje*, ed. Grzegorz Motyka, Dariusz Libionka, Warszawa 2002; *Akcja „Wisła*, ed. Jan Pisuliński, Warszawa 2003

² Motyka Grzegorz., *Problematyka stosunków polsko-ukraińskich w latach 1939-1948 w polskiej historiografii po roku 1989* in *Historycy polscy i ukraińscy wobec problemów XX wieku*, ed. Piotr Kosiewski, Grzegorz Motyka, Kraków 2000, pp. 166-178; *Konflikt polsko-ukraiński na Wołyniu w świetle polskiej historiografii*, *Przegląd Wschodni* 1997 (1/13); Motyka G., *Spór o UPA w najnowszej polskiej historiografii*, *Warszawskie Zeszyty Ukrainoznawcze* 2002(13), pp. 127-139.

³ Sowa Andrzej L., *Stosunki Polsko-Ukraińskie 1939-1949*; Sowa A., *Akcja „Wisła” w polskiej historiografii – aktualne problemy badawcze* in *Akcja “Wisła.”* ed. Jan Pisuliński, Warszawa 2003, pp.12-25. On the same topic: Iwaneczko Dariusz, *Sesja naukowa poświęcona historiografii stosunków polsko-ukraińskich* in *Południowo-*

Polish and that formally follow scientific criteria. The only typology of Polish historiography is the one created by Grzegorz Motyka. He distinguished four trends: revisionistic, traditional, para-scientific, and the trend represented by Polish Ukrainians.⁴

The first, revisionistic trend categorizes those historians who revise, sometimes subconsciously, the lies of historiography made by the Polish Republic of Poland (PRL). They also reconsider the negative and propagandist stereotypes about Ukrainians. This trend goes along with the views of Paris "KULTURA" editors. Its appearance in Poland was marked by the publication of a book by Bogdan Skaradzinski⁵ together with an article written by Tadeusz Andrzej Olszański.⁶ Later on, this approach can be seen in the works of Aldona Chojnowska,⁷ Grzegorz Hryciuk,⁸ Andrzej L. Sowa,⁹ Włodzimierz Medrzecki,¹⁰ Mirosław Sycz,¹¹ Grzegorz Motyka,¹² and Rafał Wnuk.¹³ Undoubtedly, Ryszard Torzecki's fundamental book also falls into

Wschodni Instytut Naukowy w Przemyślu, Biuletyn Informacyjny 1995(1); Bonusiak Włodzimierz, *Ewakuacja i przesiedlenia Ukraińców w polskiej in Polska – Niemcy - Ukraina w Europie. Model euroregionów Środkowoeuropejskiej Europy, Jak wychowywać dla Europy*, ed. W. Bonusiak, Rzeszów 1999, pp. 21-40

⁴ Motyka, *Problematyka stosunków...*

⁵ Skaradziński Bogdan, *Białorusini, Litwini Ukraińcy*, Białystok 1990.

⁶ Łukaszów Jan (Olszański Tadeusz Andrzej), *Walki polsko-ukraińskie 1943-1947* (in *Zeszyty Historyczne*, 1989(90), See too another of the author: Olszański T.A *Historia Ukrainy XX w.* Warszawa (no date of publication); Olszański T.A, *Kilka słów na marginesie referatu Władysława Siemaszki pt. „Stan badań nad terrorem ukraińskim na Wołyniu w latach 1939-1944*, w: *Polacy o Ukraińcach. Ukraińcy o Polakach. Materiały z sesji naukowej*, Gdańsk 1993; Olszański T.A, *Konflikt polsko-ukraiński 1943-1947*, in „*Więź*” 1991(11-12); Olszański T.A., *Na drodze do pojednania* in *Res Publica* 1988(11); Olszański T.A, *Polacy i Ukraińcy u progu lat dziewięćdziesiątych*, in *Warszawskie Zeszyty Ukrainoznawcze*

⁷ Chojnowska Aldona, *Operacja "Wisła" (Przesiedlenie ludności ukraińskiej na ziemie zachodnie i północne w 1947 r.)* in *Zeszyty Historyczne* 1992(102); Chojnowska A., *Przesiedlenie ludności ukraińskiej na Ziemię Odzyskane w 1947 r.*, in *Przegląd Powszechny* 1991(12)

⁸ Ciesielski Stanisław, Hryciuk Grzegorz, Srebrakowski Aleksander, *Masowe deportacje radzieckie w okresie II wojny światowej*, Wrocław 1994; Hryciuk G., *Gazeta Lwowska 1941-1944*, Wrocław 1996; Hryciuk G. *Nastroje i stosunek ludności polskiej tzw. Ukrainy Zachodniej do przesiedleń w latach 1944-1945 w świetle sprawozdań radzieckich, Polska i Ukraina po II wojnie światowej*, Rzeszów 1998; Hryciuk G., *Ukraińcy Lwowa*, in *Odra* 1997(6); Hryciuk G., *Zmiany ludnościowe i narodowościowe w Galicji Wschodniej i na Wołyniu w latach 1939-1949*, in *Przemiany Narodowościowe na Kresach Wschodnich II Rzeczypospolitej 1931-1948*, ed. Ciesielski Stanisław, Toruń 2003.

⁹ Sowa Andrzej Leon, *Postawy społeczności ukraińskiej w okresie kampanii wrześniowej 1939 roku*, in *Krakowskie Zeszyty Ukrainoznawcze* 1993 (1-2); Sowa A.L., *Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie 1939-1947*, Kraków 1998.

¹⁰ Medrzecki Włodzimierz, *Polskie relacje pamiętnikarskie i wspomnieniowe jako źródło do badania stosunków polsko-ukraińskich w okresie II wojny światowej*, in *Przegląd Wschodni* 1997(1).

¹¹ Sycz Mirosław, *Spółdzielczość ukraińska w Galicji w okresie II wojny światowej*, Warszawa 1997.

¹² Grzegorz Motyka, *Niemcy a UPA*, in *Karta* 23; Motyka G. Wierzbicki M, *Polski policjant na Wołyniu* in *Karta* 24; Motyka G., *Heros antyukraińskiego pióra*, *Dyskusja-Dyskusja* 1994(2); Motyka G., „*Łuny w Bieszczadach*” *jana Gerharda a prawda historyczna*, in *Polacy o Ukraińcach, Ukraińcy o Polakach. Materiały z sesji naukowej*, Gdańsk 1993; Motyka G., *O niektórych trudnościach badania konfliktu polsko-ukraińskiego w latach 1943-1947*, in *Kultura i społeczeństwo* 1992(4); Motyka G. *Od Wołynia do akcji „Wisła”* in: *Więź* 1998(3); Motyka G., Wnuk R., „*Pany*” i „*rezuny.*” *Współpraca AK-WiN i UPA w latach 1945-1947*, Warszawa 1997. Motyka G., *Tak było w Bieszczadach. Walki polsko-ukraińskie 1943-1948*, Warszawa 1999; Motyka G., *Postawy wobec konfliktu polsko-ukraińskiego w latach 1939-1953 w zależności od przynależności etnicznej, państwowej i religijnej*, in *Tygiel narodów. Stosunki społeczne i etniczne na dawnych ziemiach wschodnich Rzeczypospolitej 1939-1953*, ed. Jasiewicz Krzysztof, Warszawa-Londyn 2002.

¹³ Wnuk Rafał, *Wierchowiny - Huta*, in: *Polska 1944/1945 - 1989, Studia i materiały*, 1996(4); Wnuk R. Motyka G. *Podziemie polskie i ukraińskie 1945-1947*, in *Jalta, szkice i polemiki*, Warszawa 1996; Wnuk R., *Stosunek polskiego*

this category.¹⁴ His book is the first systematic presentation of Polish-Ukrainian relations during the Second World War. His findings form a reference source for all researchers in this field.

The second trend, the traditional, focuses on the description of OUN-UPA crimes in Volynia and Galicia as well as the history of the Polish underground in this territory. The following authors represent this trend: Ewa and Władysław Siemaszko,¹⁵ Włodzimierz Filar,¹⁶ Wincenty Romanowski,¹⁷ Jerzy Węgierski,¹⁸ Józef Turowski,¹⁹ Czesław Partacz,²⁰ and a large group of historians of regions.²¹ Motyka also includes works by Grzegorz Mazur here, but in my opinion his works should be treated as "revisionistic."²² However, the latest publications by

podziemia niepodległościowego i legalnej opozycji do mniejszości ukraińskiej w latach 1944-1947, in *Akcja Wisła*

¹⁴ Torzecki Ryszard, *Polacy i Ukraińcy. Sprawa ukraińska w czasie II wojny światowej na terenie II Rzeczypospolitej*, Warszawa 1993. and Torzecki R. *Sprawy polsko-ukraińskie przed i po Jaltie (1944-1945)*, *Jalta. Szkice i polemiki*, Warszawa 1996; Ryszard Torzecki, *Ukraińcy we wrześniu 1939 r.*, *Zuстріч* 1990(1).

¹⁵ Siemaszko Ewa, Siemaszko Władysław, *Ludobójstwo dokonane przez ukraińskich na ludności polskiej Wołynia 1939-1945*, vol. I-II, Warszawa 2001, Siemaszko E., Siemaszko W., *Ludobójstwo dokonane przez OUN-UPA w latach 1939-1945 na ludności polskiej na Wołyniu. Próba podsumowania*, in *Na Rubieży* 1995(4); Turowski J., Siemaszko W. *Zbrodnie nacjonalistów ukraińskich dokonane na ludności polskiej na Wołyniu 1939-1945*, Warszawa 1990; Siemaszko W., *Stan badań nad terrorem ukraińskim na Wołyniu*, w: *Polacy o Ukraińcach, Ukraińcy o Polakach. Materiały z sesji naukowej*, Gdańsk 1993.

¹⁶ Filar Władysław, *Wołyń 1939 – 1944 Eksterminacja czy walki polsko-ukraińskie*, Toruń 2003; Filar W., *Eksterminacja ludności polskiej na Wołyniu w drugiej wojnie światowej*, Warszawa 1999, Filar W., *Burza na Wołyniu. Dzień 27 Wołyńskiej Dywizji Piechoty Armii Krajowej. Studium historyczno-wojskowe*. Warszawa 1997.

¹⁷ Romanowski Wincenty, *ZWZ-AK na Wołyniu 1939-1944*, Lublin 1993.

¹⁸ Węgierski Jerzy, *Armia Krajowa na zachód od Lwowa*, Kraków 1993; Węgierski J., *Armia Krajowa w zagłębiu naftowym i na Samborszczyźnie*, Kraków 1993; Węgierski J., *Lwowska konspiracja narodowa i katolicka 1939-1946*, Kraków 1994; Węgierski J., *Lwów pod okupacją sowiecką 1939-1941*, Warszawa 1991; Węgierski J., *Oddziały leśne 19 Pułku Piechoty*, Kraków 1993; Węgierski J., *Oddziały leśne „Warta” Obszaru Lwów na Rzeszowszczyźnie wrzesień 1944-czerwiec 1945*, *Zeszyty Historyczne WiN-u* 1996(9); Węgierski J., *W lwowskiej Armii Krajowej* Warszawa 1989; Węgierski J., *Armia Krajowa w Okręgach Stanisławów i Tarnopol*, Kraków 1996.

¹⁹ Turowski Józef, *Pożoga. Walki 27 Wołyńskiej Dywizji AK*, Warszawa 1990.

²⁰ Partacz Czesław, *Wołyń i Małopolska Wschodnia – 1943, Przyczyny i skutki polityki OUN UPA*, in *Dzieje Podkarpacia*, vol. III, 1999; Partacz Cz. *Próby porozumienia polsko-ukraińskiego na terenie kraju w latach II wojny światowej*, in *Polska – Ukraina: trudne pytania*, vol. 6, Warszawa 2000; Partacz Cz., Krzysztof Łada, *Polska wobec ukraińskich dążeń niepodległościowych w czasie II wojny światowej*, Toruń 2003.

²¹ Garbacz Dionizy, *Wołyńiak - legenda prawdziwa*, Stalowa Wola 1997; Bobuś Bogusław, *Przesiedlenia ludności ukraińskiej w ramach akcji „Wisła” w świetle akt zespołu Głównego Pełnomocnika Rządu ds. Ewakuacji w Rzeszowie i wybranych akt PUR OIW Rzeszów*, in *Rocznik Historyczno-Archiwalny*, 1994(7/8); Hołub Czesław, *Okręg Poleski ZWZ-AK w latach 1939-1944. Zarys dziejów*, Warszawa 1991; *Okrutna przestroga*, ed. Dębski Jerzy, Popek Leon, Lublin 1997; Pempel Stanisław, *ZWZ-AK we Lwowie 1939-1945*, Warszawa 1990; Peretiakowicz Adam, *Polska samoobrona w okolicach Łucka*, Katowice 1995; Jaroszyński Wacław, Kłembukowski Bolesław., Tokarczuk Eugeniusz, *Luny nad Huczwą i Bugiem. Walki oddziałów AK i BCh w Obwodzie Hrubieszowskim w latach 1939-1944*, Zamość 1992; Sołtysiak Grzegorz, *Huta Stepańska*, in *Karta*, vol. 8; *Walki oddziałów ZWZ-AK i BCh Inspektoratu Zamojskiego w latach 1939-1944*, vol. 1-2, ed. Klukowski Zygmunt, Glińska Alina, Józwiakowski Jerzy, Zamość 1991; *ZWZ-AK w Obwodzie Tomaszów Lubelski. Relacje, wspomnienia, opracowania, dokumenty*, ed. Ireneusz Caban, Lublin 1997. Jaworski Edward., *Lwów. Losy mieszkańców i żołnierzy Armii Krajowej w latach 1939-1956*, Pruszków 1999; *Zbrodnie nacjonalistów ukraińskich na ludności cywilnej w południowo-wschodniej Polsce 1947-1947*, ed. Konieczny Zdzisław, Przemyśl 2001; Tłomacki Andrzej *Akcja „Wisła w powiecie białskim na tle walki politycznej i zbrojnej 1944-1947*, Biała Podlaska – Warszawa 2003.

²² Mazur Grzegorz, *Pokucie w latach drugiej wojny światowej. Położenie ludności, polityka okupantów, działalność podziemna*, Kraków 1994; Mazur G., *Główne aspekty konfliktu polsko-ukraińskiego w Małopolsce Wschodniej w*

Marek Jasiak, which Grzegorz Motyka considers "close to revisionistic," are definitely evolving towards the traditional trend.²³

The third, para-scientific trend consists of works that are of no scientific value. Their authors play freely with historical facts. They appeal mostly to the reader's emotions. Their use of sources and researchers' findings does not contribute to historical discoveries. Instead it is used to make their "true" version of events credible. It is often only politically involved publicism, not historical work. Edward Prus,²⁴ Aleksander Korman,²⁵ and Jacek E. Wilczur²⁶ are followers of this trend.

The least convincing element in G. Motyka's classification is the fourth trend, that of the Polish Ukrainians. The other three trends are distinguished by means of scientific criteria. The Polish-Ukrainian trend, however, has been defined using a national key. As a result, people who represent extremely different views and methodologies have been put under one category. For instance, Wiktor Poliszczuk looks on the OUN-UPA as only a terrorist-genocidal organization.²⁷ Mikołaj Siwicki's book is an emotional attempt to defend the reputation of the OUN-UPA.²⁸ The works of Eugeniusz Misilo,²⁹ Roman Drozd,³⁰ and Igor Halagida,³¹ written with full respect for historical methodology, fall in between these two extremes.

czasie II wojny światowej, in *Dzieje Podkarpacia*, vol. III, 1999; Mazur G., *Problemy przesiedlenia Polaków z Ukrainy i Ukraińców z Polski 1945-1946*, in *Polska-Ukraina Trudne Pytania*, vol. 8. Warszawa 2001.

²³ Jasiak Marek, *Działania partyzanckie na terenach górskich Polski południowo- -wschodniej 1942-1945*, in *Wojskowy Przegląd Historyczny* 1995(3-4), 1996(1); Jasiak M., *Struktura cywilna OUN-UPA w Polsce 1944-1947. Zeznania Jarosława Chamiwki*, in *Wojskowy Przegląd Historyczny* 1992(4); Jasiak M., *Wojsko Polskie a problem ukraiński w latach 1945-1948*, w: *Akcja „Wisła”*, Szczecin 1994.

²⁴ Prus Edward, *Legenda Kresów. Szare Szeregi w walce z UPA*, Wrocław 1995; Prus E., *Atamania UPA. Tragedia kresów*, Warszawa 1997; Prus E., *Bluff XX w.*, Londyn 1992; Prus E., *Kurhany*, Warszawa 1993; Prus E., *Operacja „Wisła”*, Wrocław 1994; Prus E., Prus E., *Taras Czuprinka*, Wrocław 1998; Prus E., *Patriarcha galicyjski*, Wrocław 1999; Prus E., *Holocaust po banderowsku*. Wrocław 2001; Prus. E. *SS Galizien. Patrioci czy zbrodniarze*, Wrocław 2001; Prus. E. *Operacja „Wisła”*, Wrocław 2002; Prus. E. *Legenda Kresów*, Wrocław 2003.

²⁵ Korman Aleksander, *Piąte przykazanie: nie zabijaj*, Londyn 1989; Korman A., *Nie ukarane zbrodnie SS-Galizien z lat 1943-1945. Chodaczków Wielki, Huta Pieniacka, Podkamień, Wincyn i inne miejscowości*, Londyn 1990; Koraman A., *Piąte przykazanie boskie nie zabijaj! Nieukarane ludobójstwo dokonane przez ukraińskich szowinistów w latach 1939-1945*, Londyn 1990; Korman A., *Stosunek UPA do Polaków na ziemiach południowo-wschodnich II Rzeczypospolitej*, Wrocław brak daty wydania.

²⁶ Wilczur Jacek E., *Ściągałem Iwana Groźnego*, Olsztyn 1993; Wilczur J.E. *Nie przemienie z wiatrem... Ojczyzna nie udziela urlopów* Warszawa 1997.

²⁷ Poliszczuk Wiktor, *Ideologia nacjonalizmu ukraińskiego według Dmytra Doncowa*, Warszawa 1995; *Gorzka prawda. Zbrodnictwo OUN-UPA (spowiedź Ukraińca)*, Toronto-Warszawa-Kijów 1995; Poliszczuk W., *Falszowanie historii najnowszej Ukrainy. Wołyń –1943 i jego znacznie*, Toronto-Warszawa 1996; Poliszczuk W. *Integralny nacjonalizm ukraiński jako odmiana faszyzmu*, vol I, *Zasady ideologiczne nacjonalizmu ukraińskiego. Ukraiński ruch nacjonalistyczny: struktura organizacyjna i założenia programowe*, Toronto 1998; *Dowody zbrodni OUN i UPA. Integralny nacjonalizm ukraiński jako odmiana faszyzmu*, vol II, *Działalność ukraińskich struktur nacjonalistycznych w latach 1920-1999*, Toronto 2000.

²⁸ Siwicki Mikołaj, *Dzieje konfliktów polsko-ukraińskich*, vol. 1-3, Warszawa 1992-1994; Siwicki M., *Polsko-ukraiński konflikt 1943-1944 rr.*, in *Studia polsko-ukraińskie. Materiały z konferencji naukowej. Kamieniec Podolski, 29-31 maja 1992*, Kijów-Przemyśl 1993.

²⁹ Misilo Eugeniusz, *„Akcja Wisła”*, Warszawa 1993; Misilo E., *Repatriacja czy deportacja. Przesiedlenie Ukraińców z Polski do USRR 1944-1946*, t. 1, *Dokumenty*, Warszawa 1996. Misilo E., *Polskie „bandy UPA”*, in *Karta* 1991(2); Misilo E., *Polska polityka narodowościowa wobec Ukraińców 1944-1947*, w: *Polska-Polacy-mniejszości narodowe*, ed. Wrzesiński Wojciech, Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków 1992.

In my mind, Polish historiography of Polish-Ukrainian relations can be described using a "perspective" key. The first group consists of historians who hold the view that to understand a phenomenon one has to look at it from more than one angle and perspective (multi-perspective). According to this rule they must abandon the role of the one-sided advocate. Such historians attempt to understand, but do not necessarily accept, the arguments of both sides. Such an attitude is captured by all the revisionistic researchers and by some Polish Ukrainians like Roman Drozd and Igor Hałagida, as well as by one Polish Belarusian, Eugeniusz Mironowicz.³²

The second group consists of researchers who approve of one, often national or sometimes state, perspective ("mono-perspective"). These include defenders of "Polish reasons," or traditionalists, and their counterpart on the "Ukrainian side of the fence", Eugeniusz Misilo.

I do not find G. Motyka's para-scientific trend part of historiography at all. These authors' works can be treated as neither scientific nor objective. Since they have shaped the historical consciousness of some Poles, I refer to these as "non-scientific" works. This non-scientific trend depicts a world seen from a supposedly "true" perspective. In addition to the above-mentioned E. Prus, A. Korman and J. Wilczur, I also include Polish Ukrainians like W. Poliszczuk and M. Siwicki in this trend. The first three represent national and anti-Ukrainian views. Interestingly, the "left-wing democrat" W. Poliszczuk and the Polish national non-scientific authors use the same jargon and reach identical conclusions. M. Siwicki, however, blames only the Poles for this conflict. Among mono-perspectivists a large group consists of authors who have partaken in or witnessed the events about which they write. W. Siemaszko, W. Filar, W. Romanowski and J. Turowski were soldiers of AK (Armia Krajowa - Home Army) in Volynia. J. Wegierski was a member of AK in Lvov. These historians admit that the main goal of their work is to commemorate these people and events. Among the multi-perspectivists there are no direct witnesses. This shows how strongly the approach of researchers is determined by their personal experiences. I need to add that such witnesses can also be found among "non-historians" like J.E. Wilczur from Lvov and E. Prus from Volynia.

²⁹ Misilo Eugeniusz, „Akcja Wisła,” Warszawa 1993; Misilo E., *Repatriacja czy deportacja. Przesiedlenie Ukraińców z Polski do USSR 1944-1946*, t. 1, Dokumenty, Warszawa 1996. Misilo E., *Polskie „bandy UPA*,” in Karta 1991(2); Misilo E., *Polska polityka narodowościowa wobec Ukraińców 1944-1947*, w: *Polska-Polacy-mniejszości narodowe*, ed. Wrzesiński Wojciech, Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków 1992.

³⁰ Drozd Roman, *OUN-UPA wobec przynależności do Polski Ludowej terenów zamieszanych przez Ukraińców*, in *Polacy i Ukraińcy podczas II wojny światowej*, ed. Bonusiak Włodzimierz, Rzeszów 2000; Drozd R., *Pomoc materialna państwa polskiego dla ludności ukraińskiej w latach 1947-1960*, in *Ukraińcy w dziejach Polski (1918-1989)*, ed. Drozd R., Słupsk-Warszawa 2000; Drozd R., *Ukraińcy w Polsce w okresie przełomów politycznych 1944-1981* in *Mniejszości narodowe w okresach przełomów politycznych (1944-1989)*, ed. Madajczyk Piotr, Warszawa 1998; Drozd R. *Polityka władz wobec ludności ukraińskiej w Polsce w latach 1944-1989*, Warszawa 1998; Drozd R., *Postępowanie polskich władz komunistycznych wobec Ukraińców w latach 1944-1956* in *Władze komunistyczne wobec ziem odzyskanych po II wojnie światowej*, ed. Łach Stanisław, Słupsk 1997

³¹ Hałagida Igor, *Ukraińcy w województwie gdańskim w latach 1947-1956*, in *Między Odrą i Dnieprem. Wyznania i narody. Zbiór studiów*, ed. Stegner Tadeusz, Gdańsk 1997; Hałagida I., *Życie Ukraińców na Ziemiach Zachodnich w pierwszych latach po wysiedleńczej akcji „Wisła”*, in *Problemy Ukraińców w Polsce po wysiedleńczej akcji „Wisła” 1947 roku*, ed. Włodzimierz Mokry; Hałagida I., *Ukraińcy na zachodnich i północnych ziemiach Polski 1947-1957*, Warszawa 2002.

³² Mironowicz Eugeniusz, *Polityka narodowościowa PRL*, Białystok 2000; Mironowicz E., *Polityka władz Polski Ludowej wobec Ukraińców w latach 1944-1947*, in: *Akcja „Wisła”*.

Adopting either a mono- or a multi-perspective scientific approach or a non-historical view defines the way in which the Polish-Ukrainian conflict in the years 1939-1948 is described. Let us examine and analyze the historical approach to certain sensitive problems:

- the genesis, duration and number of casualties of OUN-UPA mass murder
- the anti-Polish action of the OUN-UPA and ethnic cleansing
- the attitude towards Polish-Ukrainian attempts to reach agreements
- the attitude towards "Vistula" action (akcja "Wisła")

According to the multi-perspectivist approach mass murders in Volynia and Galicia were consequences of a sequence of numerous events. The long-term reasons involve the Polish-Ukrainian War in 1918, the unavoidable conflict of territorial interests, the recognition by part of Ukrainian society of the II Republic of Poland (II RP) as an occupant of Ukraine, the liquidation of the Ukrainian schooling system and the pacification of Ukrainian villages in II RP, the radicalism of some Ukrainian society, and the acceptance of terrorism as a means in political struggle. As for objective reasons, these include overpopulation and a civilizational setback in these territories.

The short-term reason has to do with the policy of the Soviet and German occupants. Soviet deportations in the years 1940-41 showed that it was possible to "solve" problems by simply removing entire social groups. At the time, Polish and Ukrainian elites were decimated in order to increase the possibility of constructive dialogue between the parties. The holocaust of Jews was intended to be "moral anaesthesia." Groups of OUN took part in pogroms organized by Germans. The Holocaust showed that it was possible to exterminate whole nations. As A.T. Olszański writes, "The people of Volynia before 1943 witnessed the crimes of the NKVD, the extermination of Jews, the starving to death of thousands of Soviet POs, drafts for slave labor during which sometimes whole villages were burned down, the reckless barbarism of German super-humans who killed people in public without any reason."³³

Multi-perspectivists unanimously claim that the anti-Polish action of the OUN-UPA was part of a plan. There are, however, some differences among them in terms of their interpretation of facts and their stress on individual elements. G.Mazur, T.A.Olszański, and R.Torzecki point out provocative activities of Soviets and Germans.³⁴ A.L.Sowa and G. Motyka claim that the onset of actions in Volynia had in view the streaming activity of guerrilla troops for which OUN was not prepared at all.³⁵ Put simply, formations of several thousand soldiers of UPA that consisted mainly of deserters from German police could not be dismissed because they had no place to which they could come back. The Germans were too strong an enemy and, moreover,

³³ Olszański A.T., *Historia* ..., p. 183.

³⁴ Mazur G., *Rola Niemiec i Związku Sowieckiego w polsko-ukraińskim konflikcie narodowościowym w latach 1942-1945*, in *Polska-Ukraina* ..., vol. 5. pp. 221-231; Mazur G., *Niemcy i Sowietci a antypolska akcja UPA*, in *Antypolska akcja OUN UPA 1943-1944* ..., pp. 121-132; Olszański A.T., *Historia* ..., pp. 186-187..., T. Torzecki, *Polacy i Ukraińcy...* pp. 264-266.

³⁵ Sowa A.L. *Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie...*, pp. 173-175; Motyka G., *Postawy wobec konfliktu polsko-ukraińskiego...*, pp. 326-329.

were already losing the war. Actions against them were not military justified. Unprepared to fight, Poles were the most convenient, vulnerable target. Removing them from territories considered to be ethnically Ukrainian by the OUN was part of the Ukrainian nationalists' political program.

Historians in this trend date the anti-Polish action to the years 1943-45, emphasizing that it only took place in Volynia and Eastern Galicia. The events of spring 1944 in eastern Lubelszczyzna they consider to be guerrilla war during which both sides, to a similar degree, resorted to the murdering of civilians. These authors emphasize that in the years 1945-47 there was no such thing as a simple Polish-Ukrainian conflict in the territory of present-day Poland. Instead, three actors were involved: the OUN-UPA, the Polish Independence Underground, and the communists. They believe that the narrowing of the conflict to two sides was only a mistake. They all agree about the estimated number of casualties. In the years 1943-47 about 80,000 Poles were killed—40,000 of them in Volynia—and about 20,000 Ukrainians.

There is a discussion among the multi-perspectivists about the goals of the anti-Polish action of the OUN-UPA. Some of them claim that there might have been an attempt to exterminate all the Poles there. In Galicia, though, murders were intended to force Poles to leave. This interpretation is favored by A.L.Sowa, for example.³⁶ Others like G.Motyka and R.Torzecki claim that the goal of the OUN-UPA had to do with the Poles' expulsion.³⁷ Mass murders served the purpose of liquidating those who resisted and of threatening others. In Volynia, however, the local leaders of the OUN-UPA misinterpreted the orders coming from Headquarters. G.Hryciuk shares G.Motyka's and R.Torzecki's views, but points out that "It was ethnic cleansing done also by genocidal methods."³⁸ It is worth mentioning here that no Polish historian of Ukrainian nationality has failed to comment on the problem of mass murder in Galicia and Volynia.

The attempts at compromise between Polish and Ukrainian undergrounds and between the OUN-UPA and AK-WiN (Zrzeszenie "Wolność i Niezawisłość" - "Freedom and Independence" Association) that were attempted in the years 1945-46 are depicted by historians. These historians stress that the attempts had tactical meaning and were full of distrust.³⁹

Multi-perspectivists look on "Vistula" action and previous deportations to the USSR (Soviet Ukraine) through the prism of human rights. Lack of agreement on collective responsibility makes them have a negative approach to Vistula action. G.Motyka states: "Instead of fighting against the UPA by means of decisive and well-prepared military operations, the authorities resorted to unethical mass deportations of civilians. The thesis that this was the only possibility of exterminating the UPA is untrue. [...] The real goal of 'Vistula' action was not the liquidation of the Ukrainian underground but a final solution to the Ukrainian problem."⁴⁰ There

³⁶ Sowa A.L. *Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie...*, pp. 198-199.

³⁷ Torzecki T., *Polacy i Ukraińcy...* p. 258-259; G. Motyka, *Tak było w Bieszczadach ...*, pp. 110-111.

³⁸ Hryciuk G., *Straty ludności w Galicji Wschodniej w latach 1941-1945*, in *Polska-Ukraina ...*; vol. 6. p. 283, Hryciuk G., *Straty ludności na Wołyniu 1941-1944*, in *Polska-Ukraina ...* vol 5, pp. 276-277.

³⁹ Motyka G. Wnuk R., „Pany” i „rezuny.”. pp.191-193; Drozd R., *Polityka władz wobec ludności ukraińskiej ...*, pp. 40-41; Zabierski Andrzej, *Próby współpracy środowisk polskich i ukraińskich w latach 1939-1947*, in *Polacy o Ukraińcach ...*, pp. 163-172; Hałagida I., *Ukraińcy na zachodnich i północnych...*, p. 29.

⁴⁰ Motyka G, *Tak było w Bieszczadach...*, p. 482. The same opinion in: Hałagida I., *Ukraińcy na zachodnich i północnych...*, p 31; Drozd R., *Polityka władz wobec ludności ukraińskiej ...*, pp. 63-64; Olszański A.T., *Historia ...*,

is a clear difference among multi-perspectivists in terms of the way they determine responsibility for Vistula action.

According to R.Drozd, "The decision for deportation was initiated by Polish authorities and approved by Soviet authorities, unlike the deportations in the years 1944-46, during which the initiating and decision-making body was the Kremlin."⁴¹ E.Mironowicz⁴² and I.Halagida⁴³ also regard the Polish communists as initiators of Vistula action. But G.Motyka and R.Torzecki are convinced about the crucial role of the Soviets in it.⁴⁴

Let us look closer at the views and interpretations of the mono-perspectivists. Researchers of this trend who are of Polish nationality claim that Polish national policy during the inter-war period was far from perfect. The responsibility for the worsening of Polish-Ukrainian relations lies on Ukrainian shoulders. About the Polish state assimilation policy in Volynia, W. Filar writes that the "realisation of such policy faced difficulties and in reality became virtually impossible. For the Ukrainians the basis of defining their own identity was the negation of anything that was Polish. For the Poles, however, the defense against Ukrainian hostility was aggressive nationalism as represented by the National Party (Stronnictwo Narodowe)."⁴⁵ Among many reasons for murdering Poles they consider the most important to be Dmytro Doncow's ideology of integral nationalism adopted by the OUN. According to Z. Palski, "This ideology alien to civilized social sciences was the reason for the mass murder of thousands of Poles and Jews... Due to the lack of politically-legal conceptions about the existence of an independent Ukrainian state, nationalists used the most primitive form of making this state come true, which was physical extermination of the element considered by them alien... Physical extermination of Poles was to replace the lack of a political program for Ukrainian nationalists."⁴⁶

The thesis of W. Siemaszko and E. Siemaszko about the clearly genocidal goal of anti-Polish OUN-UPA action in Volynia was extended to all Galicia and Lubelszczyzna. According to E. Siemaszko, "It was carefully prepared, consciously leading to the biological extermination of the Polish population as a national group... These actions targeted all Poles, regardless of their age or sex... They were carried out under the label 'Death to Every Pole.'"⁴⁷ The most serious allegations are made by R. Szawlowski. He claims that all Ukrainians inhabiting ethnically-mixed territories are responsible for ethnic crimes against Poles. He considers these crimes crueler than those committed by Germans or Soviets. He writes: "The Ukrainian genocide of Poles... was by nature designed to quickly exterminate all the Poles there and then...

p 237; Mironowicz E., *Polityka władz Polski Ludowej wobec Ukraińców w latach 1944-1947*, in *Akcja „Wisła..”*, p. 63.

⁴¹ Drozd R., *Polityka władz wobec ludności ukraińskiej ...*, pp. 61-62.

⁴² Mironowicz E., *Polityka władz Polski Ludowej wobec Ukraińców w latach 1944-1947*, in *Akcja „Wisła..”*, pp. 61-63.

⁴³ Hałagida I., *Ukraińcy na zachodnich i północnych...*, pp. 30-32.

⁴⁴ Torzecki T., *Polacy i Ukraińcy...* p. 301; Motyka G., *Postawy wobec konfliktu polsko-ukraińskiego...*, in *Tygiel narodów...*, pp. 365-366.

⁴⁵ Filar W., *Wołyń 1939 – 1944 Eksterminacja czy...*, p. 31.

⁴⁶ Palski Zygmunt, *Ukraińska myśl polityczna na Ukrainie Zachodniej dotycząca problemu polskiego w latach II wojny światowej*, in *Polska-Ukraina...*, vol 4, p. 287.

⁴⁷ Siemaszko E., *Ludobójcze akcje OUN-UPA w lipcu 1943 roku na Wołyniu..*, in *Antypolska Akcja OUN UPA...*, p. 74.

from infants to the elderly, with no exception whatsoever. In this it can only be compared to the German's total genocide of the Jews."⁴⁸ It must be emphasized that the remaining representatives of this trend do not use this extensive term "Ukrainian genocide" and instead prefer "Ukrainian nationalist genocide."

According to the mono-perspectivists of Polish nationality, this genocide began in September 1939 and ended in 1947.⁴⁹ They consider all Poles who were killed by Ukrainians to be victims of genocide, regardless of the situation in which they were killed. As a result, soldiers killed by communist rebels in September 1939, victims of common criminals, AK soldiers who died in battles with the UPA, Poles serving in "istribitielnych" battalions (supporting police forces of NKVD) in the years 1944-45, members of the Secret Police (Urząd Bezpieczeństwa) killed in action, any militia, and soldiers of the Polish Army are also considered victims of genocide. In the assessment of the period 1944-47 we come up against paradoxes. A member of the Secret Police or militia killed by the Polish Underground is treated as a collaborator with the occupant. The killing of a similar person by the UPA, however, is treated as a "Ukrainian Nationalist crime."⁵⁰ Between mono- and multi-perspectivians there is an agreement as to the number of victims in this conflict: 80,000-100,000 Poles and 20,000 Ukrainians.

Researchers of the mono-perspective trend claim that during WW II differences between Polish and Ukrainian territorial interests were so huge that there was no hope for any agreement. They regard the continual attempts to come to some agreement as part of a deliberate, wicked game of the Ukrainian side.⁵¹ Its purpose was to sedate the alertness of the Polish Underground. These historians do not comment on the 1945 agreement between the AK-WiN and UPA in Lubelszczyzna, which was obeyed. They hold favorable views towards Vistula action. According to their opinion, the state well-being has priority over human rights. As a result they approve of the notion of collective responsibility. M. Jasiak writes: "The expulsion of Ukrainian people during 'Vistula' action can be justified by Polish reasoning of state. State authorities cannot allow the existence of a military underground that attempts to separate a part of territory and create its own national state."⁵² In one of Z. Palski's articles, Vistula action is portrayed as almost humanitarian: "Persons of Ukrainian nationality moved during 'Vistula' action were not homeless or abandoned in the snows of taiga or deserts of Kazakhstan. They were not sent for slave labor in the mines. They were given post-German farms in the northern and western parts of Poland, with generous help from the state... Taking painful, radical, decisive action contributed to the cease of bloodshed and created a chance to start a normal life... The goal of 'Vistula' action was to provide safety and peace to all Polish citizens, regardless of their nationality. All state authorities are obliged to follow such action, regardless of their political provenience. Polish authorities used with it only the necessary, minimal power towards certain

⁴⁸ Szawłowski Ryszard, *Wstęp* in. Siemaszko W., Siemaszko E., *Ludobójstwo dokonane przez...*, p. 12.

⁴⁹ Filar W., *Ukraińsko-polski konflikt narodowościowy na południowo-wschodnich Kresach II RP: przebieg, skutki, przyczyny, wnioski na przyszłość*, in *Polska-Ukraina...*, vol. 9, pp. 301-302.

⁵⁰ *Zbrodnie nacjonalistów ukraińskich na ludności cywilnej...*, pp. 111, 113, 115, 117, 121, 138, 203, 220.

⁵¹ Filar W., *Wołyń 1939 – 1944 Eksterminacja czy...*, p. 340, 346; Partacz Cz., *Próby porozumienia polsko-ukraińskiego na terenie kraju w latach II wojny światowej...*, in *Polska-Ukraina...* p. 47.

⁵² Jasiak. M., *Geneza i przebieg akcji „Wisła”*, in *Polska-Ukraina...*, vol 8, pp. 151-152.

citizens of the Polish Republic who were Ukrainian nationality, which—in the light of international law—violated the duty of being loyal to the state."⁵³

I consider E. Misilo, a Polish Ukrainian, a mono-perspectivist. He writes about only the Polish-Ukrainian conflict in the territory of present-day Poland. This allows him to ignore any anti-Polish action of the OUN-UPA in Volynia and Galicia. He fails to mention the Polish-Ukrainian agreements of 1945. This is all the more surprising since its consequences were of major importance to the problems he studied. E. Misilo's research focuses on the expulsion of Ukrainians from Poland to the USRS and Vistula action. If we trust his interpretations, Polish communist authorities were fully independent decision-makers. In his model the Soviets are equal partners with the Polish communists. He writes: "The signing of the agreement by the authorities of Soviet Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania and Poland on exchanging populations was one of the first steps taken by Polish communists."⁵⁴ According to E. Misilo, at the turn of July 1945 Polish communists decided on total and obligatory expulsion of all Ukrainians. The Soviet initiative to use force during this expulsion was secondary. It made it possible to realize previously made decisions. He is also convinced that Vistula action was wholly a Polish initiative. It was taken due to the refusal of the USRS to accept another group of those who were expelled.⁵⁵ E. Misilo diminishes the importance of UPA activity. He emphasizes the military weakness of this formation and ignores the criminal actions against Polish civilians. At the same time, he stresses the brutality of the Polish Army, militia, and Secret Police. The reader receives a portrayal of innocent Ukrainians, brutal, cruel Polish communists, and a common Polish support for expulsion.

In the third, "non-scientific" trend there is a group represented by E. Prus, A. Korman and J. Wilczor. They all strongly support the idea that one cannot talk about a Polish-Ukrainian conflict, but only about the genocide of Poles by Ukrainian nationalists. Works by these authors are written in the form of a lampoon. E. Prus's and J. Wilczor's books do not include footnotes and have only bibliographies. This prevents a reader from confirming facts which are often more than doubtful. For instance, in one of his books E. Prus writes that in Sachryn, near Hrubieszow, Ukrainians murdered each other.⁵⁶ However, all of Polish historiography and the memories of Home Army soldiers state clearly that it was an action of Polish underground.

While A. Korman uses footnotes, their content is sometimes confusing. In one text, for example, he writes: "The UPA was supported by the NKVD against the Poles, which means a depolonisation of Malopolska Wschodnia and Volynia, mainly because of crimes against humanity, and was also supported by German special forces, especially Abwehra II, against the Home Army and Soviet guerrilla troops under the red and black Bandera flag." The footnote reads: "In the act of II (Cracow) Great Sobor of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists it was declared that the OUN symbol was a red and black flag, with red at the top and black below... the red symbolized Moscow and blood, whereas the black symbolized Berlin and soil."⁵⁷

⁵³ Palski Z., *Polityczne, ekonomiczne i narodowościowo-demograficzne następstwa operacji „Wisła”* in. *Polska-Ukraina...*, vol 8, pp. 192-193.

⁵⁴ Misilo E., „*Akcja Wisła.*”, pp. 14-15.

⁵⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 18-19.

⁵⁶ Prus E., *Melnykowcy – kolaboracja czy opór*, Wrocław 1994, p. 28.

⁵⁷ Korman A., *Stosunek UPA...*, p. 13.

These authors give a high estimation of the number of victims in Poles (300,000-500,000). They say that the OUN and UPA had nothing to do with independence. They have no doubt that the main goal of Ukrainian nationalists was genocide of the Poles. They do not mention any casualties on the Ukrainian side. They date it to the years 1939-1956. In their historiographic narration there is no room for any Polish-Ukrainian agreements, neither for those made during the war nor for the successful agreement of 1945. All three fully approve of communist Poland and the activities of the communist military formations. Members of the communist terror formations (UB, MO members of *istriebitielne* battalions) are, according to them, representatives of Polish society and the Polish state.

For them, Vistula action was the only feasible solution. E. Prus writes, "'Vistula' action was a defense reaction of the Polish government to the outrageous murders of Ukrainian nationalists in south-eastern Poland. And then the previously set goals were fulfilled, preventing genocide."⁵⁸ According to J.E. Wilczor, "The real culprits of 'Vistula' action were the headquarters of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists as well as the leaders of its military wing of the UPA. It was they who, by initiating civil war in Polish state territory in order to separate a part of it, by using inhumane fighting methods and committing genocide, provoked this action."⁵⁹

W.Poliszczyk holds a special place among the non-scientists. As a Ukrainian politologist who deals, so to speak, "scientifically" with the problem of Ukrainian nationalism, he is sometimes seen as a credible person. To the Polish reader, he tries to play the role of the "good Ukrainian"; good, because he condemns Ukrainian nationalism. W.Poliszczyk claims that the OUN-UPA was scarcely supported by Ukrainian civilians, and that its dense web was built only because of the terror they used against the Ukrainians. He persistently disregards strongly emphasized elements of independence fights in the program of Ukrainian nationalists. In his opinion, the source of all evil in Polish-Ukrainian relations is "Ukrainian nationalism, which should not be confused with the Ukrainian independence movement... For tactical reasons Ukrainian nationalism has identified its ideology with Ukrainian patriotism from the very beginning of its existence, thus misleading not only ordinary Ukrainians, but also scientists, politicians, and many Polish and western historians. Frankly speaking, Ukrainian nationalism, being a developed and intensified form of fascism-Nazism, was antagonistic to Ukrainian patriotism."⁶⁰

W.Poliszczyk creates the following interdependence: integral Ukrainian nationalism is Nazism, and the Greek-Catholic Church helped it spread around. Greek-Catholics were thus nationalists and not patriots. The real, genuine Ukrainian patriotism can be found only in eastern Ukraine, not in Galicia or Volynia. Writing about the Greek-Catholic Church he says, "This Church became a national Church, Ukrainian-Halic to be precise, so it left the road of the Catholic Church, which has lost the international character of the Roman Church."⁶¹ He considers right-wing organizations in western Ukraine and Ukrainian emigration circles to be of Banderian character. From his proofs he draws far-reaching conclusions of a purely political character, such as: "These days, Polish-Ukrainian talks could only be held between the states,

⁵⁸ Prus E., *Operacja „Wisła,”* p. 81.

⁵⁹ Wilczur E.J., *Nie przeminie z wiatrem...*, p. 231.

⁶⁰ Poliszczuk W., *Falszowanie historii...*, pp. 75-76.

⁶¹ Poliszczuk W., *Integralny nacjonalizm ukraiński...*, p. 94.

since Ukrainian nationalism has not yet gained power. It is a mistake to hope for a positive result from any Polish-Ukrainian talks held while strong Ukrainian nationalism is present in Poland in the form of the Ukrainian Association in Poland, or while, in the west, the whole structure is under a strong influence of Ukrainian nationalism."⁶²

W. Poliszczuk, like representatives of the non-scientific group of Polish nationality, gives full support to Vistula action. He also deliberately overlooks attempts to reach agreements and also presents exaggerated numbers of UPA casualties among Poles (125,000) and Ukrainians (40,000).⁶³

Mikolaj Siwicki is a mirror reflection of W.Poliszczuk and E.Prus. According to him, it was the Poles who started the fighting in Volynia against the "Ukrainian masses," which—under suppression—had to fight back. Thereafter came the mass murders of Ukrainians, done by Poles who tried to push the border further east including Galicia and Lubelszczyzna.⁶⁴ The goal of the Poles was, according to Siwicki, Ukrainian "genocide." To do so, both Polish communists and the London group "collaborated." In the territory of present-day Poland this genocide "turned out to be successful."⁶⁵ He fails to speak of any Polish casualties of the conflict, not to mention the anti-Polish action of the UPA. According to Siwicki, the Poles have always collaborated with the occupant against innocent Ukrainians.⁶⁶ Finally, he states that Polish society, unlike Ukrainian society, is "degenerated," "lives in the dark of lies," and "has been infected with imperialistic ideology for centuries." At the same time, using an "ethnic" term, he tries to prove that Podbeskidzie, eastern Lubelszczyzna, and Podlasie are indigenous Ukrainian territories. In this black-and-white world, there exists no room for agreement between the AK-WiN and UPA. Vistula action, then, was an act of Polish genocide on Ukrainians. On the very first page of his book he claims that an extermination of Ukrainians took place in the territory of present-day Poland. According to him, those to blame are the Polish emigration authorities, who planned and realized this process by means of guerrilla troops and civilians, as well as the post-war Polish authorities, who took over the problem of de-Ukrainization from the emigration government, and who realized it by means of Vistula action.⁶⁷ If one bears in mind certain historical knowledge about M.Siwicki, it is difficult to imagine that he had no idea as to how much he was manipulating historical facts.

In short, it must be said that the last fifteen years of research into Polish-Ukrainian relations have made great progress. This has been possible thanks to the abolition of censorship and the new accessibility of the archives of communist secret police. It is also invaluable to be able to take part in the discussion between Polish and Ukrainian circles. It has revealed the fact that the "separation line" does not run along national antagonisms. Ukrainian historiography has its own multi-⁶⁸ and mono-perspectivists⁶⁹ as well as non-scientists.⁷⁰

⁶² Poliszczuk W., *Falszowanie historii...*, p. 90.

⁶³ Poliszczuk W., *Dowody zbrodni...*, pp. 656-663, m, p. 733

⁶⁴ Siwicki M., *Dzieje konfliktu...*, vol III, k. 16-17.

⁶⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 58.

⁶⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 16, 40, 45

⁶⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 11.

⁶⁸ See e.g. books by Ihor Iliuszyn or Jaroslaw Hrycak.

⁶⁹ See e.g. books by Jaroslaw Daszkewycz or Wołodymyr Serhijczuk.

⁷⁰ See e.g. books by Zubenko Bohdnan.